Roads are being franchised to private firms in many countries, raising the issue of regulating the tolls they charge. When there is more than one road to get from one point to another, regulation need not be necessary, since competition may substitute for toll regulation. This paper studies toll competition among private asymmetric roads subject to congestion. We obtain two main results. First, in equilibrium tolls are higher than optimal, that is, there is too little congestion. This happens because road owners internalize the reduction in drivers' willingness to pay due to congestion, thereby softening competition. It follows that the drawback of private competition is exercise of market power, not excessive congestion as is sometimes conjectured. Second, the distortion becomes smaller as market size and the number of roads grow, even if the density of drivers does not change. In the limit tolls converge to the socially optimal level and are just enough to make each driver internalize the congestion externality. This suggests that the scope for competition is better in larger networks.
Introduction
In many countries roads are being franchised to private firms. 1 In exchange for toll revenue, the franchise holder finances, builds, operates and maintains the road. 2 When the franchised road has no close substitute, the government must regulate tolls. Yet when there is more than one way to get from one point to another, as is often the case in large cities, competition between several franchise owners might substitute for regulation. 3 This paper studies toll competition among private asymmetric roads subject to congestion. We find that tolls tend to be too high in equilibrium (i.e., there is too little congestion), and that the distortion tends to disappear as market size and the number of roads grows. In fact, in the limit tolls converge to the socially optimal level and are just enough to make each driver internalize the congestion externality.
In our model a pair of locations is joined by several asymmetric roads. Each road is subject to congestion and run by a different operator. Private road owners compete by setting tolls. Drivers choose which road to travel to minimize the generalized travel cost.
We find sufficient conditions for existence of a pure strategy equilibrium with strictly positive tolls. While the franchise holder incurs no direct costs when one additional car uses the road, a lower toll increases the congestion cost borne by users. Since congestion reduces drivers' willingness to pay for using the road, franchise holders partly internalize congestion costs when setting tolls. This softens price competition and the equilibrium is similar to the one that obtains in a standard Cournot game. The cost of congestion acts like the capacity constraint in Kreps and Scheinkman's (1983) two stage oligopoly game, in which capacity is chosen in the first stage and firms compete in prices in the second stage. This runs counter to the intuition that toll competition will lead to Bertrand outcomes and excessive congestion. In fact the opposite is the case and tolls are higher than the socially maximizing tolls. Moreover, we show that the traffic assignment among roads is generally inefficient; that is, taken as given the number of drivers, they ć ould be reallocated and welfare increased. Hence, with a small number of roads the problem is that competition between road owners is too soft-a market power problem-, and not, as is sometimes conjectured, that Bertrand-like competition will lead to excessive congestion. 4 We also find that distortions tend to disappear when the number of roads increases, even if the density of drivers is kept constant. In the limit tolls are set at the socially optimal level-that is, just enough to make each driver internalize the congestion. And this holds under rather general conditions, including asymmetric roads and franchise holders that price strategically. Hence, even if demand is kept proportional to the network size, the scope for competition is larger in larger networks.
This paper is related to the literature on road pricing pioneered by Walters (1961) . 5 Traditionally, this literature has studied road pricing as a standard planning problem. 6 Our model generalizes the one developed by Ve rh o e f , Nijkamp and Rietveld (1996) who studied strategic toll setting by two competing private road owners. 7 It is also related to de Palma and Lindsay (2000) , who compare the results of competition among two identical alternative roads under various ownership regimes, and model congestion with Vickrey's (1969) bottleneck model. In this paper we ignore the dynamics of congestion but consider asymmetric roads. Moreover, we study competition when drivers can choose among more than two roads. Last, Viton (1995) has studied whether a private road can profitably compete with an untolled public road.
The paper also suggests a close relation between the economics of franchised roads and the economics of clubs. 8 Roads are subject to congestion, much like standard club goods. As in Scotchmer's (1985a Scotchmer's ( , 1985b analysis of club goods, this paper models the strategic interaction of road owners and looks for Nash equilibria. Yet roads differ from clubs in two relevant dimensions. First, geographic constraints determine the characteristics of competing roads, thus the symmetry assumption commonly made in the club literature is not justified. Second, the free entry assumption stressed in Scotchmer (1995b) is not realistic for roads either. This paper may therefore be viewed as an extension of the main results in Scotchmer (1985a Scotchmer ( , 1985b to the case of a fixed number of competing asymmetric roads. This extension builds on Wardrop's (1952) characterization of equilibrium traffic assignments among roads.
The inefficiency of a price equilibrium has been noted by Levhari and Luski (1978) in the context of waiting times for service by duopolists and by Häckner 4 See, for example, De Palma (1992). 5 See Hau (1992) for a survey and Mohring (1994) for a collection of the most important articles. 6 For early contributions see Levy-Lambert (1968) and Marchand (1968) . Recent contributions are the series of papers by Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey (1990 , 1993 , 1994 . 7 See also de Palma (1992). 8 See, for example, Berglas (1976 Berglas ( , 1981 , Berglas and Pines (1981) , Boadway (1980) and Scotchmer (1985a Scotchmer ( , 1985b and Nyberg (1996) in the case of reciprocal externalities, including congestion. We extend these results to the case in which congestion costs are different for the different roads. The inefficiency of traffic assignments under congestion has been noted before (Sheffi, 1985) , but it apparently has not been observed to apply to the case of private toll networks. Reitman (1991) has shown that in the case of symmetric congestion costs, road replication in the limit leads to the efficient solution.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3 we solve the problem of the social planner. Section 4 analyzes competition among roads. Section 5 studies the case where competition increases and finally, section 6 concludes.
The model
There are n roads that join two locations. The marginal benefit of an additional trip when Q trips have already been made is B(Q) ≥ 0, with B < 0, and
where q i is the number of trips made on road i. We assume that traffic imposes no maintenance or other costs on the road operator. 9 The cost of making one trip on road i has two components. First, the toll charged by the road operator, p i ; second, the time cost of making a trip when q i cars are already on the road, c i (q i ), where c i > 0, c i > 0, and c i > 0. Thus p i + c i (q i ) is the generalized travel cost faced by each driver. As is well known since Wardrop (1952) , in equilibrium the number of cars on road i is determined by
for all roads i; that is, users will enter roads until the marginal benefit of an additional trip equals the generalized travel cost in each of the n roads. We are ready to examine the social planner's problem.
The social planner
In this section we solve the problem of a social planner that can choose both the total number of vehicles travelling, Q, and their distribution on alternative roads,
The first term is the sum of benefits that drivers obtain from Q ≡ ∑ i q i trips. The second term is the sum of the congestion costs borne by drivers. Since tolls redistribute income from users to the owner of the road, they do not affect social surplus directly. Next we show that the objective function (3) is concave and provide conditions for existence and uniqueness of a solution.
Proof: See the appendix.
Assume that all traffic flows in the planner's solution are positive. It then follows from Proposition 3.1 that the first order sufficient conditions of this problem are
That is, the benefit derived from the last trip must be equal to the sum of the private cost c i and the congestion externality q i c i (q i ) in all of the n roads. From the equilibrium condition (2) and the optimality condition (6) it follows that the planner can implement the optimum by charging a set of tolls (p
Oligopoly
Consider now the case when each road is owned by a different operator and they compete for traffic by simultaneously choosing tolls. The owner of road i takes (p j ) j =i as given and chooses p i to maximize
In this section we prove existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and show that in equilibrium the number of vehicles on the road is less than optimal. Moreover, we show with an example that the traffic assignment is inefficient when congestion costs are asymmetric, i.e., the marginal cost of using a road (including congestion costs) is not equalized across roads.
We begin by proving a series of lemmas necessary to prove to the main proposition of the section. Given p ∈ R n we may interpret (2) as defining q ∈ R n as a function of p. We show next that the corresponding inverse function-q as a function of p-is well defined:
Lemma 4.1 Equation (2) implicitly defines q as a function of p. Furthermore, this function is continuously differentiable in all coordinates.
The next lemma signs the own and cross partial derivatives of traffic with respect to tolls. It also derives identities relating both kinds of derivatives.
Lemma 4.2 The functions q i (p), defined implicitly via (2), are such that (i) ∂q
Note that equation (8) implies that c j (q j )(∂q j /∂p i ) does not depend on j, ∀j = i.
Lemma 4.3 For all i, c i (q) + qc i (q) is increasing in q.
Proof: Trivial, given the properties of the cost function.
The following result provides sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1 Define k
i = 1/c i (q i ) and denote S −i (k) = ∑ l =i k l .
Assume that B(Q) is concave and that
Then there exists an interior Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: See the appendix for the proof and for non trivial examples where the above conditions hold.
We are now ready to prove the main result in this section.
be the Nash equilibrium (assumed interior). Then:
The traffic assignment across roads may be inefficient.
Proof: (i) From the equilibrium condition (2) we have that
Furthermore, an interior Nash equilibrium is a solution to the FOC of the profit equations (7):
Using the first order condition (12) to substitute for q N i , in equation (11) leads to
where the last inequality is due to (9). 11 Now, suppose that, contrary to the proposition, Q N ≥ Q * . Then there exists i such that q N i ≥ q * i and
where the strict inequality follows from (13) and the weak inequality from Lemma 4.3. But since B (Q) < 0, Q N < Q * , in contradiction with our initial assumption, which completes the first part of the proof.
11 Some tedious but straightforward algebra shows that this FOC is equivalent to (ii) To prove the second part of the proposition we present a counterexample that shows that the Nash equilibrium does not always lead to an efficient assignment of traffic. Let c i (q i ) = c i q i , c i > 0, i = 1, 2 and B(Q) = 1 − Q. The corresponding demand functions for the roads are:
Solving the first order conditions for each firm leads to the Nash equilibrium tolls:
Replacing in the expression for q i we can compute the total marginal cost
Performing the computations leads to TMC i = TMC j if and only if c i = c j . Hence the traffic assignment in the example is inefficient unless congestion costs are identical across roads.
What is the intuition behind Proposition 4.2? Consider the decision of a road concessionaire. As in any market, the attractiveness of lowering the toll a bit is to attract new users, which yields p i ∆q i . The cost, of course, is that users that were already using road i now will pay q i ∆p i less. So it all depends on how many new users will be attracted by a lower toll.
In the standard Bertrand model, lowering the toll an epsilon is enough to attract the whole market. Thus p i ∆q i is large, q i ∆p i is negligible and, as a consequence, price competition is very intense. Congestion, however, implies that road i becomes less attractive at the margin the more users switch to it, thus compensating the lower toll. Roughly speaking, if concessionaire i wants to attract a lot of new users she will have to lower her toll, p i , a lot as well, to compensate new users for the increased congestion. This softens price competition and, in equilibrium, all concessionaires charge tolls higher than those needed for users to internalize the externality they create.
Limit results
In the previous section we have shown that the Nash equilibrium of the game between road owners is inefficient. In this section we show that as the economy becomes large, tolls converge to the socially optimal level. In order to get interesting results, we allow demand for roads to grow at the same rate as capacity expands. Nevertheless, drivers are free to choose any of the roads on any of the networks. Hence, our limit results depends solely on the reduction in the relative size of each individual owner with respect to the market and hence on her smaller ability to affect prices.
We begin by considering the replication of complete road networks, where networks are composed of n ≥ 1 roads with possibly different congestion costs. The first result is that the traffic in each network tends to the efficient assignment as the number of replications increases. 12 Next we consider the special case where networks have only one road and extend the previous result by showing that convergence is monotonous in the number of roads.
Consider the case where there are R identical networks, each one composed of n (possibly asymmetric) roads. The replicated roads are located in parallel, so that a traveller chooses only one road. The following notation is used throughout:
Demand is assumed to grow at the same rate as capacity. That is, each time that a network is replicated another set of drivers with demand B(Q) is added. Hence the marginal benefit function for the replicated network, denoted by B R (Q), is related to the marginal benefit function of an individual network by
Definition 5.1 A symmetric equilibrium satisfies q r i (R) ≡ q i (R), p r i (R) ≡ p i (R) and Q r (R) ≡ Q(R) for all i, r.
Note that all the results derived in section 4 apply in this section since network replication is a special case of a network with n arbitrary roads. The following proposition shows that when the number of replications is very large, each road in each network approximately carries the optimal number of users and charges the optimal toll.
Proposition 5.1 Assume the planner's solution, which trivially is independent of the number of replications, is interior. Then for sufficiently large R there exists a unique interior symmetric equilibrium (q i (R), p i (R), Q(R)), and
12 A similar result appears in Scotchmer (1985a) for club goods.
Proof:
Whenever it is not a source of confusion, we omit writing out explicit dependence on R. From (2) we have B R (Q R ) = p r j + c j (q r j ), and since B R (Q R ) = B(Q R /R) = B(Q), it follows that B(Q) = p r j + c j (q r j ), which, by symmetry, can be written as
Symmetry also implies that we can write the following partial derivatives independently of the network:
Thus d ii denotes the cross partial derivative of traffic with respect to tolls for the same road on different networks, while d i denotes the own price elasticity for any of the R versions of road i. From Lemma 4.2 it follows that the former is positive while the latter is negative. ¿From (9),
Applying (4.3) to the composite network consisting of nR roads leads to
where we used the fact that B R (Q R ) = B (Q R /R)/R = B (Q)/R. Now, substituting into (16) the expression for d ji derived in (15) we get:
which, solving for d i leads to:
with
Since B < 0 and c i > 0, we have that
≤1,
and we can write:
where d i and c i depend on R and lim R→∞ O i (1/R) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n. Now the first order conditions can be written (using symmetry) as:
Replacing (14) and (19) in the first order conditions and manipulating yields
where α ≡ 1/R. Next we extend the O i (α) functions to all α ∈ [0, 1] in such a way that the resulting functions are continuously differentiable and then apply the Implicit Function Theorem to the set of equations in (21) at q i = q * i and α = 0 (i.e., at the planner's solution). The proof that the corresponding Jacobian is non singular is analogous to that of Lemma 4.1. It follows that (21) has a unique solution for all α in a neighborhood of α = 0 (i.e., for all R large enough) and, since the solution is continuous in α, that the corresponding q i 's converge to q * i as α tends to zero. From (14) it follows that:
so that, by continuity of B and c i ,
Comparing the above identity with the planner's first order condition it follows that p i (R) converges to q * i c i (q * i ).
The intuition behind Proposition 5.1 is as follows. As the size of the market increases, the gain in users from a given fall in prices ∆p i increases as well, and becomes very large when the market is large. On the other hand, the cost of lowering p i , q i ∆p i , remains at about the same order of magnitude, because q i 's order of magnitude does not change if both demand and the number of roads are replicated at the same rate. This implies that p i ∆q i /q i ∆p i grows without bound as the market is replicated, thus making price competition tougher and replicating "perfect" competition in the limit.
The previous result shows that the allocation of traffic in a road system where independent road owners set tolls converges to the efficient allocation as the capacity of each road becomes smaller in relation to size of the market. In the special case in which each "network" has a single road we can go further and show that convergence to the efficient allocation is monotonic.
Definition 5.2 Let p 1 (q) = B(q) − c 1 (q). We denote the elasticity of demand in an economy with one road by η 1 (q) = p 1 (q)/[qp 1 (q)]. (18) becomes
it follows from (17), after some manipulation, that:
We now replace (14) and (22) in the first order conditions (20) to obtain:
Next, since from the definition of η 1 and (2) it follows that
, the preceding expression leads to:
Multiplying (23) by R and differentiating across with respect to R, we get:
with (25) ¿From the assumptions on η 1 (q) and (25) it follows that L(q) > 0. Also, the left hand side of (24) is negative by (13). Therefore (24) implies that dq dR > 0. And since (14) implies that dp dR
we have that dp dR < 0, which completes the proof.
Conclusion
Major increases in congestion over the last two decades, combined with a trend toward smaller government, have made private toll roads increasingly attractive in the United States. 14 The standard option for privatizing roads is a Build-Operateand-Transfer (BOT) contract, where a firm builds and operates the road for a long period of time, and then transfers it back to the government. When the franchised road has no close substitute, the government must regulate tolls. Yet when there are alternative routes from one place to another, competition between several franchise holders might substitute for regulation. This is the topic we study in this paper, obtaining two main conclusions.
At first sight it would appear that, as in the case of Bertrand competition, toll competition between two roads that are substitutes will lead to tolls set at marginal cost, i.e., zero in our case and excessive congestion. However, lowering tolls raises congestion costs for all users of the road and therefore does not lead to a complete switch of users to the road with the lowest toll. Hence, the owner of each road faces a demand curve that is not infinitely elastic. Thus our first result that competition yields tolls that are higher than optimal and traffic flows that are inefficiently small-there is too little congestion. The result is due to the capacity constraint in roads, i.e., it is related to the idea that a price game when there are capacity constraints does not lead to the Bertrand result but is closer to a Cournot equilibrium (see Kreps and Scheinkman [1983] ).
It is interesting to note that a similar result holds for a toll road that is a substitute of a public untolled road. The owner of the tolled road will be able to exact a positive toll, given sufficient congestion on the alternative road. A decrease in congestion in the untolled road hurts the private road. Hence, its owner will oppose all attempts to increase the capacity of the untolled road. For example, in the case of the Dulles Greenway near Washington D.C., a toll road that joins Dulles Airport to Leesburg in Virginia, the owner of the road has opposed the expansion of competitive public freeways which are untolled. 15 The second result shows that as the number of independently owned roads increases the increased number of participants in the market makes road system more competitive, even if demand increases at the same rate. In fact, in the limit both total traffic flow and traffic allocation will be efficient. This suggests that in some cases where there is more than one road joining two cities or parts of a city, toll competition may be a viable way of regulating private roads.
Last, there is close relationship between competition between private toll roads and competition between clubs, which may allow the transfer of results between these two fields.
15 See Viton (1995) , Verhoef et al. (1996) D(λ 1 , . . . , λ n ) denote, respectively, a n by n matrix with all elements equal to 1 and a diagonal matrix with i-th element on the diagonal equal to λ i . A straightforward calculation shows that the Hessian of S may be written as
Given a column vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) we have that
Since k < 0 and all λ j > 0, it suffices that one of the x i 's differ from zero to have x Hx < 0. Thus S is strictly concave. Since B < 0, we have that
It then follows from assumption (4) that there exist q 1 , . . . , q n such that the partial derivative evaluated at q = (q 1 , . . . , q n ) is negative if any of the q i 's is larger than the corresponding q i . Hence we may restrict maximization of S to a compact subset of the positive orthant. Since a continuous function over a compact set has a maximum, it follows that S has a maximum. Due to strict concavity of S this maximum, denoted by q * , is unique.
B Proof of Lemma 4.1
A straightforward calculation shows that the Jacobian matrix corresponding to p as a function of q is of the form
where the notation is the same as in the proof of Proposition 3.1 and
Denote the i-th column of the Jacobian matrix by J i . To show that the Jacobian is non singular, we show that if α 1 , . . . , α n are real numbers such that ∑ i α i J i = 0 n , where 0 n denotes the vector in R n with all coordinates equal to zero, then all the α i 's are equal to zero.
A straightforward calculation shows that ∑ i α i J i = 0 n implies that:
Summing over j leads to: Having shown that the Jacobian is non singular, we may now apply the Implicit Function Theorem to conclude that the inverse function is well defined and differentiable.
C Proof of Lemma 4.2
From (2), p j + c j (q j ) = p i + c i (q i ), j = i. Differentiating with respect to p i leads to the identity in (8). Differentiating both sides of (2) with respect to p i leads to the identity in (9).
The two identities we just proved imply that:
Next we prove (i) and (ii). From the identity in (9) and the assumption that all c j > 0 we have that all ∂q j /∂p i have the same sign, j = i. If this common sign were negative, (9) implies that ∂q i /∂p i < 0 and the left hand side of (30) would be negative while the corresponding right hand side was positive. If all ∂q j /∂p i were equal to zero, j = i, then (30) and the assumption that B < 0 imply that ∂q i /∂p i = 0. Yet then the right hand side of (9) would be positive while the left hand side is zero. We conclude that ∂q j /∂p i > 0 for all j = i. It then follows from (30) that ∂q i /∂p i < 0, for otherwise the left hand side of (30) would be positive while the right hand side was negative. We have thus shown (i) and (ii). The inequalities in (9) and (4.3) now follow trivially.
D Proof of Proposition 4.1
To the notation introduced when stating the proposition add: , ∀i is sufficient for existence of a Nash equilibrium. 16 The non-trivial assumption is α
1 > 0, we want c i (0) > 0.
